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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
 
STATE OF IDAHO,  
 


















          NO. 44577 
 
          Minidoka County Case No.  
          CR-2016-1317 
 
           
          RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
 
     
      Issue 




Alarcon-Sanguino’s Sentencing Challenge Is Barred By The Doctrine Of Invited Error 
 
 The state charged Alarcon-Sanguino with trafficking in methamphetamine, 
possession of methamphetamine, possession of drug paraphernalia, and driving without 
obtaining a driver’s license.  (R., pp.21-24.)  Pursuant to a plea agreement, Alarcon-
Sanguino pled guilty to an amended charge of possession of methamphetamine with 
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intent to deliver, and the state withdrew the remaining charges and agreed to 
recommend a sentence of “no more than” seven years, with three years fixed, and that 
Alarcon-Sanguino be placed on probation or, at worst, that the court retain jurisdiction, 
depending on the recommendation of the presentence investigator.  (R., pp.28-34; 
7/26/16 Tr., p.9, Ls.5-14; 9/19/16 Tr., p.21, Ls.14-21.)  The presentence investigator 
thereafter recommended that Alarcon-Sanguino be placed on probation.  (PSI, p.17; 
9/19/16 Tr., p.21, L.21.)  At sentencing, both the state and counsel for Alarcon-
Sanguino asked the court to “follow the plea agreement” and the recommendation of the 
presentence investigator that Alarcon-Sanguino be placed on probation.  (9/19/16 Tr., 
p.24, Ls.12-14, p.25, L.25 – p.26, L.3.)  The district court declined to place Alarcon-
Sanguino on probation but imposed a unified sentence of seven years, with only one 
and one-half years fixed – a lesser sentence than that contemplated by the plea 
agreement.  (R., pp.48-51; 9/19/16 Tr., p.33, Ls.15-18.)  Alarcon-Sanguino thereafter 
filed a notice of appeal timely from the judgment of conviction.  (R., pp.52-54.)  He also 
filed a timely Rule 35 motion for reduction of sentence, which the district court granted 
by placing Alarcon-Sanguino on probation. (Order on I.C.R. 35 Motion for Correction or 
Reduction of Sentence (Augmentation).) 
Alarcon-Sanguino asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it 
imposed a unified sentence of seven years, with one and one-half years fixed, because 
he accepted responsibility and was going to be deported.  (Appellant’s brief, pp.3-4.)  
Alarcon-Sanguino’s claim of an abuse of sentencing discretion is barred by the doctrine 
of invited error.   
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A party is estopped, under the doctrine of invited error, from complaining that a 
ruling or action of the trial court that the party invited, consented to or acquiesced in was 
error.  State v. Carlson, 134 Idaho 389, 402, 3 P.3d 67, 80 (Ct. App. 2000).  The 
purpose of the invited error doctrine is to prevent a party who “caused or played an 
important role in prompting a trial court” to take a particular action from “later 
challenging that decision on appeal.”  State v. Blake, 133 Idaho 237, 240, 985 P.2d 117, 
120 (1999).  This doctrine applies to sentencing decisions as well as to rulings during 
trial.  State v. Leyva, 117 Idaho 462, 465, 788 P.2d 864, 867 (Ct. App. 1990).  
The plea agreement called for the state to recommend a sentence of no more 
than seven years, with three years fixed, with the court either retaining jurisdiction or 
placing Alarcon-Sanguino on probation.  (R., pp.28-34; 7/26/16 Tr., p.9, Ls.5-14; 
9/19/16 Tr., p.21, Ls.14-21.)  At sentencing, Alarcon-Sanguino’s counsel specifically 
requested that the court follow the plea agreement, and the court ultimately imposed a 
sentence less severe than that contemplated by the plea agreement and placed 
Alarcon-Sanguino on probation.  (R., pp.48-51; Order on I.C.R. 35 Motion for Correction 
or Reduction of Sentence (Augmentation).)  Because his underlying unified sentence of 
seven years, with one and one-half years fixed, is a lesser sentence than the one he 
actually requested, Alarcon-Sanguino’s claim of an abuse of sentencing discretion is 
barred by the doctrine of invited error.  The judgment and sentence should therefore be 




 The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment and sentence. 
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